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FOHFEirED GRANTS NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD. 
MARCH 22, 18~6.-Referred to the Honse Calendar and ordered to be printed. 
JUNE 17, 1886.-0rdered to be reprinted. 
Mr. HENLEY, from the Committee on the Public Lands, submitted the 
following 
REPORT· 
[To accompany bill H. R. 147.] 
The Oorn'mittee on the Public Lands, to u·hom were referred sundry bills for 
the fotfeiture of the land gTant to the N oTthern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany~ sub'mit the following report : 
Your committee hereby adopt as their report the report of the Public 
Lands Committee made to the House of Representatives in the Forty-
eighth Congress. Tile legal status remains the same, and your com-
mittee therefore have concluded to present that report, as it stands, as 
their report to this Congress : 
[House Report.No. 1256, Forty·ei~hth Congress, first session.] 
The Committee on the Public Lands, to whom were referred sundry bills for the 
forfeiture of the land grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, submit the 
following rel>ort: 
Your committee have given the sul)ject-matter of this grant patient, careful, and 
thorough consifleration. They are satisfied that the grant was one in prresenti upon 
<Jondition subsequent; that by breach of such condition the grant, along the entire line 
so far as it was uncomplete<l on the 4th day of .Jnly, 1879, is, and has been since said 
date, subject to forfeiture, and that, justice to the United States and her citizens now 
require that a forfeiture and restoration of the lands to the public domain shoald be 
declared by act of Congress. To accomplish that result and at the same time protect 
purchasers of the company's t•tle prior to January 1, 1884, and actual settlers and 
owners of valuable improvements on the odd sections adjacent to the uncompleted 
portions of said road who settled or made said improvements with bona fide intent to 
secure title through the company, your committee have prepared a substitute for said 
bills, and herewith report the same to the House and recommend it~ passage. 
In view of the fact thnt the conclusion to which your committee have arrived was 
earnef!tly combatted by learned counsel in elaborate argument and brieii;, we deem it 
proper to 1efer tiOmewl!at minutPly and in detail to what we consider the most ma-
terial points of the case, especia1ly as it was nrgP<1 that the grant to this company 
was in certain features an exception from the otherwise unbroken line of forfeitable 
grants, an isolated example of unparalleled generosity ou the part of the United 
States in giving away millions of acre:s of the public domain without any provi:sion 
for resuming its titl<' even upon absolute failnre of the company to fulfill its part of 
the contract. That such a construction in effect of the granting act was not only 
seriously but earnestly and forcibly urged by learned and distinguished counsel for 
the company, is the apology of your cnmmittee for what might otherwise be deemed 
an unnecessary elaboration of the :subject under consideration. 
The act of Congress containing the grant to this company was approved July2, 1864 
(13 Statutes, 365), and the graut itself was in extent the most munificent of all the 
pr~ncel.Y d011at~ons made in the ~ra C!flil;>eralityto aid in the cons~ruc.tion of railroads, 
bemg for 20 mtles along the enttre hue m all the States, and 40 miles mall the Territo-
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ries through which the line might he located, with the right of indemnity selection 
within 10 additional miles, afterward by subsequent act (16 Stat., 2i8) enlarged to 2() 
miles, for all lands lost. in the grant in place. 
The land affected by the grant and subject to its operation was in fact all odd-num-
bered sections in a belt of the public domain extending over 2,000 miles, from Lake 
Superior to Puget Sound, 40 miles in width in all the States and 80 miles in wid.th in 
all the Territories through which the linP should be located. 
The consideration of this munificent grant, as specifically declared ·by the act itself, 
was ''to secure the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of 
war, and pub1ic storPs" over said railway (section 3), "to promote the public interest 
and welfare by the construction of said railroad. aud telegraph line," to keev "the 
same in working order," and ''to secure to the Government at all times, but particu-
larly in time of war, the use and benefits of the same for postal, military, and other 
purposes." (Section 20.) 
Section 3 of the act embracing the grant of lands was in the following words: 
"SEC. 3. And be it j1u·ther enacted, That there be and is hereby granted to the Northern 
Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, for t.he purpose of aiding in the 
construction of said railroad and telegraph line to the Pacific coast, and to secnre the 
safe and speedy transportatioi! oftbe mails, troops, munitionsofwa.r, and pnblic stores, 
overtherouteof sai<lline of railway, every alternate section of public land, not mineral, 
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile, on 
each side of said railroad line, as said company ma.y adopt, through the Territories of 
the United States and ten alternate sections of land per mile, on each side of said rail-
road, whenever it passes through any State, and whenever, on the line thereof the 
United States have full title, not reserYed, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, 
and free from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road is 
definitely fixed and the plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office; and whenever, prior to said term, any of said sections or parts of sec-
tions shall have been granted, sold. reiierved, occupied by homestead settlers, or pre-
empted, or otherwise disposed of, other lands shall he st~lected by said company in lieu 
thereof, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in alternate sections and 
designated by odd numbers, not more than 10 miles besond the limits of said alter-
nate sections." 
Section 5 of the act was in the following words: 
"SEC. 5. That the said Northern Pacific Railroad shall be constructed in a substan-
tial and workmanlike manner, with all the necessa.ry draws, culverts, bridges, via-
ducts, crossings, turuouts, stations, and watering places and all other appurtenances, 
inclnding furniture and rolling stock, equal iu all respects to railroads of the first class, 
when preparerl. for business, with rails of the best qua.Jity, manufactnr<'d from Ameri-
can iron. A.nd a uniform gauge shall be established throughout the entire length of 
the road. A.ud there shall be constructed a telegraph line of the most substantial 
and approved description, to be operated along the entire line: P1·orided, That said 
company shall not charge the Government higher rates than they do individuals for 
like transportation and telegraph service. A.nd it shall be the duty of the Northern 
Pacific Railroad Company to permit any other railroad which shall be authorized to 
be built by the Unitet.l States or by the legislature of any Territory or State in which 
the same may be situated, to form running connections with it, on fair and equitable 
terms." 
Section 8 of said act was in the following words : 
"SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That each and every grant, right, and privilege 
herein are so made and given to and accepted by said Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, upon and subject to the following conditions, namely: That the sa.id company 
shall commence the work on said road within two years from the approval of this act 
by the President, and shall complete not less tllan 50 miles per year after the second 
year, and shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete tLe whole road by the 4th clay 
of Jniy, A.. D. 1876." 
Section 9 of the a<lt was in the following wo·rds : 
"SEC. 9. Ancl be itj'l11·ther enacted, That the United States make the several conc1i-
tioned grants herein and that the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company accept the 
same upon the further conclition, that if the company make any breach of the condi-
tions hereof and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then in such case, 
at any time hereafter, the United States, by its Congress, may do any and all acts and 
things, which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of said 
road." 
The period fixed by the eighth section of the granting act above quoted within which 
the road was required to be completed was snbsequeutly extended to the 4th day of 
July, 1879, as appears from the following facts: The joint resolution of May 7, 1866 
(14 Stat., :355), extended the time two years, and the joint resolution of July 1, 1tl68 (15 
St.at., 255 ), amended section 8, the original granting act, so as to read July 4, 1877. On 
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June 11, 1879 (General Laud Office Report, 1879, pp.109-111 ), the Secretary of the In-
terior held that the effect of these two joint resolutions was to extend tile time to July 
4, lb79. In this view your committee concur, and we adopt that date as the expiration 
of the period of limitation. 
The total length of the line as located and proposed, including the Washington Terri-
tory Branch, was 2,~70 miles. Prior to JnlJ" 4, 187H, there had been complete,l531 miles 
of road, leaving 1, ng miles uncompleted at the expiration of the time limited. (See 
report of Secretary of the Interior to Forty-seventh Congress, Ex. Doc. No.144, p. 41.) 
In round numbers and estimated, 10,675,200 acres are by the bill reported conceded to 
the compauy, and 27,53!.1,840 acres subjected to forfeiture. 
The consideration of the case involves two general and leading questions: First, the 
power of Cougress to declare a grant of public lands forfeited for breach of condition 
subsequent; second, whether, this power being established, there are any features in 
this particular case excepting the grant from the general rule. 
The pow·er of Congress to declare forfeit(.'d a grant of the public lands, made to either 
a corporation or a State, b.v an act containing a clause providing that the lands should 
revert. upon failure to build the road within a specified time, is established beyond all 
controversy by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court. 
It is specifically so held in United States t•s. Repentigny (5 Wall., 211) and Schulen-
burg VB. Harriman (21 \Vall., 44). 
Following these cases is another which even more unequivocally defines the power of 
Congress in this regard. In Farnsworth VB. Minnesota aud Pacific Railroad Company 
(92 U.S., 66), the court, considering the question, said: 
"A forfeitnre by the State of an interest in lands and connected franchises, granted 
for tile constrnct1on of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the 
conditions annexed to their grant or their possession, when forfeiture is provided by 
statute, without judicial prooecdings to ascertain and determine the failure of. the 
grantee to perform the conditions." 
Following these authoritative expositions of the law, as well as the reasons and 
sense of the principle involved, your committee have uniformly held that jurisdiction 
existed in C:ongress to declare these grants forfeited and have reported several bills to 
accomplish that purpose some of which have already passed the House. We adhere 
to this position in the case nuder consideration. 
Your committee are also clearly of the opinion that there is nothing in the provision~ 
of the Northern Pacific act which tal,es it out of the category of grants upon condition 
subsequent, liable to forfeiture for breach of condition. . 
The question turns upon a consideration of sections 3, 5, 81 and 9, hereinbefore quoted. 
The company claim that they constitute an absolute dedication of the lands to the 
purpose of constructing the road; that there is no condition subeeqnent whatever, 
and that the only power iu the United States is tho power through Congress to adopt 
such measures as may be necessary to insure the completion of the road, in case the 
company does not build it. 
On the other hand, your committee regard this construction as utterly untenable, 
and are clearly of the opinion-
1. That section 8 of the act declares a condition subsequent, viz, t-hat the road shall 
be completed within a certain time, upon breach ofwhich the grantor may declare a 
forfeiture. 
2. That section Y is in no wa.y repugnant to section 8, but while embracing all that 
is included therein, and to that extent perhaps cumulative, is also, in connection with 
section fi, a declaration of further and additional conditions &ubsequent, for breach of 
which Congress may interfere to protect the rigilts of the United States. 
~- That under either of sai(l sections, or both together, the United States, by Con-
gress, bas the right to declare the grant for.feited for failure to build the road within 
the limitation. 
I. 
Section 8 is perfectly plain in the language used and the purpose contemplated. It 
declares in so many words that the grant made is given by the United States and ac-
cepted by the company "subject to the following conditions, namely, that the said 
company " " * shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the whole road," &c. 
This is too plain for any construction. Congress intended to provide, and did provide, 
that the road\. should be completed within a certain time, and that that should be a 
condition of the grant. If a condition, the gnnt is determinable upon its breach, at 
the option of the grantor. 
The argument of the company rests n pon the absence of express words declaring are-
version in case of the breach. That, in the judgment of your committee, was entirely 
unnecessary in order to create an estate upon condition subsequent. The estate, so con-
ditioned, is created by declaring the condition, not by declaring the result of its 
breach. The latter, re-entr.v or its equivalent, follows as a matter of legal effect. 
Every lawyer knows the result of a breach of condition subsequent, and the statement 
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of that result in any grant ad1ls nothing to the preYions cl<'scription of the estate cre-
:.t<'rl. The land does "reYert '' b~' operation of htw upon the breach lJtjing er!forced by 
re-ent1y or its eqniYalent; bnt the nght to that re-entry dt>peud::; upon no express 
1n·ovisions tllat the Jau<.l :shall revert. It stands upon the condition declared al_ld its 
breach. Upon thi:s poiut \Ye quote from the report of the Public Lands Committee, 
made at this sessioll of Congre~:>:s upon the l..Jill forfeiting the Texa::; Pacific land grant, 
rt'ported to tbe House by Judge Pa~·son: 
"In otber \Yords, generally stated, the distinguisbed counsel for the company de-
clares that in la·w the power to declare a forfeiture of a grant made ou condition sub-
sequent for l..Jreach of the condition must l..Je reserved to the grantor by express terms 
in the act of making tlte grant, or it does not exist. 
"No authority was lJroduced to the corumittee except the statement of the attor-
neys a 'Serting this extraordinary doctrine in support of it; but the interest being so 
.great, we have examined the books on the question, and are not able to find a single 
authority in support of the proposition, an1l we believe none can l..Je found. 
"On the contrary, '"\Vasbbnru on Real Property (vol. 2, 3d ed., p. 15) asserts the rule 
to he: ' Where the condition of a grant is express t,here is no ueed of reserving a right 
of entry of a breach therrof in order to enable tbc grantor to avail himself of 1t.' See 
also JackROll VB. Allen, 3 Cowan, 2:W; Gray vs. Blanchard, t; Pick., 284; Littleton, sec. 
331. 
"[ndeed, all the decided cases we can find, as well M the text-books, are in harmony 
and to the sawe effect; so we do not present argument upon jt here." 
The estate is created by proper words of description declarillg the condition, and the 
legal efi'ect of what follows the breach is exactly the sa,me whether it be descril.Jed in 
the grant or not. Thus in the case under cou:;ideration the estate upon condition is 
created by the specific language u~:>ed. The )(•gal effect of reversion follows the breach 
and declaration of forfeiture. No p1·ovision that the land should revert was neces-
sary, and if added would simply bave described the legal result of what preceded it. 
The Touchstone, page 122, tl:lus describes the operative words creating an estate on 
condition: 
"Uonditions aunexed to estatt>s are sometimes so placed and confoumled among cove-
nants, sop:1etimes so ambiguously drawn, aud at all timE's have in their drawing so 
much affinity with limitatwns, that it is bard to discern ancl distinguish them. Know, 
therefore, for the most part, conditions ha\'e conditioual words in their frontispiece, 
. and do begin therewith , and that among these words there are three words that are 
most proper, which in their own natnre and efficacy, without any addition of other 
words of re-~>ntr~· in the conclusion of the conclition, do make the estate conditional, 
as proviso, ita quod and sub conditione.'' 
Washburn, in his work on Real Property, marginal page 42, says: 
'' AHwng the forms of expression which imply a condition iu a grant the writers 
give the following: •On condition,' 'provided always,'' if it shall so happen,' or 'so 
that the grantee pay, &c., within a specified time,' and grants made upon any of these 
terms vest a conditional estate in the gTantee." 
·when the condition of a grant is express, there is no nece sity of reserving a right of 
entry for breach of the condition, in order to enable the grantor to take advantage of it. 
(Jackson' vs. Allen, 3 Cow., 220; Gray tJB. Blanchan1, 8 Pick., 284.) 
That the words" upon condition," and even words les~; specifically expressing tbe in-
tent, are construed as establishing an estate upon condition sn bseq nent, without further 
description, is bhown by many authorities. (Litt~eton, pp. 228, ~W.I, :~30, Com. Dig. 
Condition A 2; 2 Wood, Com. Powell's ed., 505, 512, et seq.; Wheeler t•s. Walker, 2 
Conn., 201; Thomas -vs. Record, 477 Me., 500; Sharon Iron Co. 1'8. Briu, 41 Penn. St. 
341; Taylor vs. Cedar Rapid R. R. Co., 25 Iowa, 371; Attorney-Genemlvs. Merrimack 
Co., 14 Gray, 612; Hadley VB. Hadley, 4 Gray, 145; Rawson VB. School District, 7 Allen, 
128; Caw. vs. Robertson, 1 Selden, 1~5; Pickle t•s. McKissick, 21 Penn. St. 232; Hooper 
vs. Cummings, 45 Me., 359; Chapin VB. School, 35 N. II., 450; Wiggin vs. Berry, 2 
Foster, 114; Hayden vs. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 534; Wright vs. Tuttle, 4 Day, 32().) 
Authorities upon this point might be multiplied. It is tho construction of principle 
and authority, and your committee have been referred to uo case which in their judg-
ment milita,tes at all against tbe position here assumed. Tho Touchstone, at page 122, 
immediately following the quotation which we have made~ if:l suggested as modifying the 
authorityofthe citation in its applicability to the case under consideration. .But nosnch 
effect can possibly be given the lang11age used. After :statmg the broad proposition 
q noted, the writer proceeds to say that although the words mentioned are "the most 
proper words to make conditions," yet that they are sometimes used for other purposes. 
He then points out instances where the word "proviso" in certain particular relations 
may be given a different meaning. But the entire discussion is limited to that par-
ticular word-does not once mention the words "Bnb conditione" or name a single in-
stance where they are used in a sense contrary to the general rule, and even in re-
spect to the word "proviso " the exception could not apply to the case under consicl-
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era tion, for it is ex pre sly limited to a use of the wonl where it does not stand '' origi-
nally, by and of itself." 
The other authorities to which we have been referred are not ,in any sense repug-
nant to the view of the law we adopt. They are few in numbers, and at the best 
simply hold that these apt words may, in certain instance~, be restricted by immedi-
ate reference to other portions of the deed clearl.v expressing a different intent in the 
grantor. That this is true is not denied; but it does not change the general rule, and 
its applicability to the case under consideration will more properly be noticed here-
after. 
\Ve are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that section 8 of the act, by the express 
language used, created an estate upon condition subsequent, forfeitable upon breach 
of the condition. 
II. 
Section 9 of the act, while perhaps embracing the preceding section within its pro-
visions, and possibly to that extent cumulative., is also a provision prescribing certain 
other and additional conditions subsequent. 
It will be noticed at the outset that by its specific language it embraces more than 
one grant, th@ exact words being "the several conditioned grants herein," an(l that it 
relates to a "fnt"t.her" condition. The "further" condition was that if the company 
should make any breach of "the conditions hereof" and the same should continue 
for a :vear, theu the United St~tes might, &c. Now, jt is obvions npon the mere rearl-
ing that this lauguag·e tloe~-; not primarily relate to section B, for that ~-;ectiou onl~- ap-
pertai us to one grant, needs no "further" condition, a,ud tlle [HOVlsion tha,t tlw tleliwlt 
shonltl continne for a year or upwards would lHtYe no pertinence. This section evi-
dentlv relates to some otlwr condition tha,n tha.t mentioned in sectinn tl. 
Th~se othe_r conditions or 1·eqnirf'mf'nt:; are fonnfl in section 5, which provides that 
six separate and dist inet tiling-~-; should be <lone by the company, YlZ: 1st, that tlle roatl 
shonld bo constrncte<l in a suiJstantial and workmanlike manner, equal iu allre~-;pects 
to first- cla!'is rallroa<l; 2<1, tba.t it shonld he ma<le of rnils of the best qnality, mann-
factnred from American iron; 3d, that a nniforrn gauge shoul<l be established through-
out the entire line; 4t,h, that the company should constrnct a telegraph line of the 
most approved and sullstantial description; 5th, that it should not charge the Go,·-
ernment higher rates than individuals, and, 6'th, that it sbonltl permit other railroa<l~ 
to make running connections on fair and reasonable terms. TheRe are the other an<l 
further conditions meutione<l by section 9, in default of any of which, continuing for 
a ~'ear, Congress should have the right to "do any and all acts and things" to secure 
the "speedy completion of the said road," as contemplated and provided. 
The intent of Congress, expressed with abundant precision in the act itself, and as 
eYery one knows, as a matter ufhistory, was to iusure the coustruction witlun the time 
prescribed of a substantial, first-class, and throughly-eqnipped railroad from Lake Su-
perior to the Pacific, suitable and available in all emergencies for uso by the United 
States-in peace for the transmission of its mails; in war for the carrying of troops and 
supplies. Congress did not donate 48,000,000 acres of the puiJlic domaiu to this company 
without expecting and requiring some equivalent. Among t.he tbiugs it did require wa::1 
the construction of a first-class road for the purposes and in tlle manner indicated. It 
accordingly prescribed the various req nirements above recited, and to insnre obedience 
to its mandates it providerl by section 9 that in default of any of the same Congress 
might do anything necessary to complete the road in the manner contemplated and 
prescribed. The enactment of these provisions would have been futile had uo reser-
vation been made of a right to enforce them. \Vithout such a resen-ation the Govern-
ment, npon default of the company, ~onld have had nothing left except a cla.im 
a::;!"ainst the company for breach of con't.ract or of coYenant. To prevent snch a con-
dition of a.ffairs the right was reserved to further legislate to compel obedience to its 
mandates. These requirements then became additional conditions snllsequeut which 
Congress could enforce by forfeitnre or l.iy any other remedy deemed appropriate and 
adeqnate. That was the object, scope, and intent of section 9, and it is expressed in 
unam hignons phrase. 
It hl no answer to this proposition to say that these requirements might be ~nforced 
by the general forfeiture provided by section . 
The road might have b<>en llnilt within the time limitecl, and yet eYery one ot' these 
conditionR been broken. The grant could not then have b<>en forfeitecl at all nncler Rec-
tion tl. A road would ha.ve heen completed, aurl though hnilt in ah<;olnte disregard of 
all the reqULremerHs of section 5, the Government wonl<l have lJeen pnwerleH'> either to 
resume the grant or compel the cotnpany to perform the condition. That s~dion 9 re-
latE's to other conditions than that me1otion<><l in section 8 is also apparent from tbe 
use of the words" and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year." These 
words, if applied to the condi tious mentionecl in section 5, mean something. If ap-
plied to section they are nonsensical. If Congress had intended to ex. tend the period 
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mentioned in section 8 one year, it would have said July 4, 1877; not July 4, 1876r 
and another year thereafter. 
It is thus apparent that section 9 of the act has a scope and effect far beyond any-
thing embraced by section 8; that it legislated upon fnrther and additional subjects; 
bas a separate and distinct function of its own, and that instead of limiting or con-
trolling the precedwg section it creates additional obligations and liability on the 
part of the company. 
The only answer to this position advanced by the company is the suggestion that 
if this be trne~ then the two sections are utterly inconsistent with each other. It is 
difficult to understand how this can be seriously urged. We have already sbown a 
different legal scope and operation for each under the construction we have adopted. 
They are not repugnant or inconsistent in the slightest degree. Each stands for its 
own particular purpose. On the other hand, the construction contended for by the 
company would violate well-established rules of construction simply to disregard the 
plainly expressed intent of Congress. They cla1m that the two sections should be 
taken together, and that so taken all that Congress could do upon failure of the com-
pany to build the road would be to take all necessary steps to compel its completion, 
without power to forfeit the grant. 
This position is untenable under the rules of construction because, first, it assumes 
au ambiguity, and then to reconcile it rejects the usual and ordinary signification of 
terms and phrases; twice reads as singular a word in the plural, and construes 
"further condition" as if the word" further" was omitted; second, with reference to 
a simple time condition, viz, that the road should be built by Jnly 4, 1876, it adds the 
senseless expression, ''provided the same shall continue unbuilt one year;" third, it 
excludes all of section 3 from its relations and connect.ions with section 9, and either 
1·ejects it entirely or makes it practically inoperative; fourth, it violates the manifest 
general intent of the entire act and the general policy of Congress prevailing at the 
time in respect to these grants. 
Another oonsideration is to be noticed. The provision of section 9 is permissive or 
directory only. Congress may do all necessary things, &c. It is not mandatory, as 
it would have been if intended as the sole remedy for the breach of the condition of 
section 8. So, too, it is not exclusive of other remedies for the breach. Congress 
may in that way enforce the forfeiture or may do it otherwise. 
We have been referred to some authorities which are supposed to sustain the forced 
construction of the act contended for, but after the most careful examination of them 
we are unable to recogpize any doctrine contrary to that we have adopted for our 
guidance. The strongest cited are undoubtedly the cases of the Episcopal Mission vs. 
Appleton et al. (17 Mass., 326) and Stanley vs. Colt (5 Wall., 119). They do not estab-
lish any new doctrine or any principle repugnant to the authority of the long line of 
cases we have cited. 
In the former, the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking of a voluntary deed 
for charitable purposes, say: 
"Although the words' upon condition' in a conveyance of real estate are apt words 
to create a condition, any breach of which will forfeit the estate, yet they are not to 
be allowed that effect when the intention of the grantor, as manifested by the whole 
deed, is otherwise." 
And in the latter, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of a devise for 
certain. charitable purposes, say: 
''It is true the word 'proviso' is an appropriate one to constitute a common-law 
Mndition in a deed or will; but this is not the fixed and invariable meaning at-
tached to it by the law in these instrnments. On the contrary, it gi\·es way too the 
intent of the parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, &c." 
The principle announced by these rl<'cisionA is simply the universal rule of construc-
tion giving effect to the real intent of the parties to an instrument when the same can 
be fairly ascertained from the language used. In other words, that technical expres-
sions and phrases ordinarily yield to a contrary plainly expressed intent. Bnt the prin-
ciplfl has no applicability to the case under consideration, for there it-> no intent, either 
expressed or to l.>e reasonably implied, contrary to the technical meaning of the woros, 
"upon condition." On the contrary, the act from beginning to end displays in every line 
a most deliberate, well considered, anti matured intention not to l.>estow this princely 
gift without so circnlllscril.>ing and limiting the company by these conditions as to secure 
the ol.>ject, and every object, which Congress had in view. It shows the clearest inten-
tion in the mind of Congress to create a condition subsequent forfeiting the grant for 
failure to build the road within the prescriLed period; aud also other condltions-sub-
sequeut, put:ing it in the power of Congress, even after the road had been built, to 
enforct' the requirements of the act touching the manner of its construction. In the 
judgment of your committee there is not a word in the act indicative of an intent to 
limit or curtail the teclmical words of condition used. 
And aside from the language of the act itself, it is incredible that Congress conld 
bave intended in this, probably the largest and most valuable grant of lands ever 
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made to a railroad company or a State, to depart from the uniform and uninterrupted 
policy of legislation for years, and allow the company to appropriate this vast belt of 
the public domain without restriction, reservation, or control. Your committee can-
not subscribe to such a doctrine and can find .no argument, even plausible, to support 
it. We are clearly of opinion that Congress intended to provide for a forfeiture upon 
failure to build the road within the prescribed period, and that the language used was 
~bundantly sufficient in law to accomplish that intent. 
III. 
Your committee are also well satisfied that even under section 9 of the act, in the 
sense in which it is construed by the company, Congress had and has the power to 
declare a forfeiture. It is concedeq that under it Congress can do any and all acts 
and things needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the road. Con-
gress is the sole and exclusive judge of whether the road has at any time, in point of 
fact, been completed; and if not, what remedy should be applied. Tbe remedy of 
iorfeiture is included within the general power reserved. The road is in fact uncom-
pleted to this <lay. Congress can now, by virtue of that very reservation, so strenu-
ously insisted upon by the company as protecting the grant, declare the same for-
feited and restored to the public domain. Might not the forfeiture of the grant in 
thelhands of this company and the consequent creation of an open field for equal 
competition best conduce to the speedy, ultimate completion of the entire line¥ If 
Congress so view the matter, there can be no doubt of its power to declare the for-
feitnre under tbe very clause of the act relied upon by the company for its protection. 
OTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE FORFEITURE CONSIDERED, 
Certain other considerations have been presented to your committee, as objections 
to declaring a forfeiture, which we deem it proper to notice. 
First. It is argued that Congress having by the joint resolution of May 31, 1H70 (16 
Stat., 378), authorized the company to issue bonds and execute a mortgage upon its 
property and franchises, cannot now do au act by which the interests of the bond-
holders, or others claiming under the mortgage, will be injuriously affected. 
The argument is plausible, but not sound. It is correct in theory, but fallacious as 
applied to the facts of the case under consideration. It rests upon the false assumption 
that Congress authorizedamortgage oftheunconditionalfee, whereas it did nothing of 
the kiud. It permitted a mortgage of "the property and rights of property of all 
kinds and descriptions'' of the company. 
The property and rights of property belonging to the company, so far as its lands 
were concerned, was not the absolute, unc0nditional fee. lt was the fee charged with 
the condition subsequent. Tbat was the estate, and the only estate, which the com-
pany ownt>d, or which it was a-uthorized to ~ortgage. The mortgagee took the es-
tate, as it was, chargeu with the condition. If no breach occurred the estate became 
absolute; upon breach the forfeiture could be enforced against the mortgagee as well 
as the mortgagor. Congress, by the joint resolution, diu not enlarge the grant; it 
simply gave its assent to a mortgage of the grant as it stood. 
The mortgagee took with his eyes open; receivecl a defeasible estate, the character 
of which be is presumed to have known; and be simply stands in his grantor's shoes 
as respects the question of forfeiture. This is well settled. 
In Touchstone, at page 120, it is thus tersely stated: 
''And if he that bath the estate grant or charge it, it will be subject to the condition 
Rtill; for the condition doth always atteml and wart upon the estate or thing whel'e-
unto it is annexed; so that a1thongh the same do pass through the hands of au hun-
dred men, yet it is subject to the couuition still." 
And again, at page 154 : 
"It is gt'nerally true that he that doth enter for a condition broken doth make the 
estate void ab initio, and that be shall be in of his first estate in the same courtJe and 
manner as it was when he departed with the possession and at the time of the making 
of the condition. And hence it is that, if there be any charge or encumbrance on the 
lauds, as if the lessee of land upon condition grant a rent charge out of the land or enter 
into a statute or recognizance and the con usee has the land in execution and this charge 
is after the condition is made, in this case when the condition is uroken and the party 
doth re-enter he shall by relation avoid the rent, statute, and recognizance and hold 
the land freed from them all." 
Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property (vol. 2, pp. 44, 5:l) thus refers to the question: 
'·Where a person enters for a condition broken the estate becomes void, ab initio; 
the person who enters is again scizeu of his original estate in the same manner as if 
he had never coll\·eyed it away. Auu as the entry of the ft·offer on the feoffee for a 
condition broken uefeats the estate to which the condition was annexed, so it defeats 
all nghts and incidents annexed to that estatt>, together with all charges aud incum-
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brances created by the feoffee during his possession; for upon the entry of the feoffer 
he becomes seized of an estate paramount to that '?thich was subject to these charges.'' 
Washburn on Real Property (vol. 2, p.ll, marginal page 451) says: 
''When such entry had been made the effect was t.o reduce the estate to the same 
plight, and to cause it to be held in the same terms as if the estate to which the con-
dition was annexed had not beeu granted.'' 
And Kent thus states the same principle (vol. 4, p. 125): 
"Persons who have an estate or freehold subject to a condition are seized and may 
convey, though the estate will continue defeasible until the condition be performed 
or release, or is barred by the statute of limitation or by estoppel." 
In Foxcroft vs. Mallet ( 4 How., 377) the Supreme Court of the United States, speak-
ing directly upon this very quest10n, arising upon a mortgage of an estate upon condi-
tion subsequent, say: . 
"The condition, or charge, was on the land as an incumbrance by the very terms of 
the deed to him, and he could not, if he tried, convey a title to the land which should 
be free from it. Such a condition attaches to the land wherever it goes, although the 
same should pass through a hundred bands. In our view, it operates like a cove-
nant which runs with the land, and aU assignees are bound by covenants real that 
run with the land." 
So, in the case under consideration, the mortgagee took only tbe title of the mort-
gagor, charged with its defeasible quality. In the language of the Supreme Court~ 
the mortgagor could uot, if he tried, convey a title to the land which would be free 
from the charge. 
The bondholders and others claiming under the mortgage simply stand in the shoes 
of the company. They could not and did not take any greater or Letter estate than 
their grantor held, and that was an estate subject to forfeiture for condition broken. 
We have been furnished with no authorities containing a contrary view of tbi~ 
question, and we believe 1 hat none exist. In fact, the '''bole argument of the counsel 
for the company upon this point rests, as before stated, npou the erroneous assump-
tion that Congress in some way, by the joint resolution referred to, enlarged the 
estate of the company, or authorized them to mortgage a greater estate than they 
theretofore possessed. Ab no foundation for such an assumption can l>e found, either 
expressed or implied, in the joint resolution in qnestiou, it follows that the parties are 
relegated to their rights as defined by the au1Jhorities we have cited, which are al>so-
lut~ly conclusive of the whole controversy. 
Second. It is said that Congress should not now declare a forfeiture because the 
United States, as is alleged, did not sea~onahly comply with what is deemed a require-
ment of section 2 of the granting act relative to t.he extinguishment of Indian titles. 
The pertinent portion of that section is· in the followiug words: 
"The United States shall extinguish as rapidly as may be consistfont with public 
policy and the welfare oft be said Indians~ the Indian titles to all lands falling under the 
·operation of this act and acquired in the donation to the road named in this bill." 
The Indian lands in respect to which this complaint against the Govern went is 
raised are a tract lying between the Red RiYer of the North and the James River in 
Dakota; the Sioux Reservation in Dakota; the Crow Reservation in Montana; the 
Camr d'Alene Reservation in Idaho; and the Yakima and Puyallup Reservations in 
Washington Territory. 
It i.s claimed that the provision of section 2, above quoted, required the United States 
to extinguish the Indian title to these tracts, and that l>ecause this, as is alleged, was 
not seasonably done, the company is released from the condition su bseq uen t. To sup-
port this claim is cited the well-recognized rule that if. the ,Performance of a condition 
subsequent is rendered impossible by act of the grantor it becomes void. 
It will be observed that the provision of law quoted applies only to lands "falling 
under the operation of the act and acquired in the donation t.o the road named in 
this bill." None of the tracts named were acquired in the donation unless perhaps it 
be the first one ment.ioned. By section 3 there are excepted from the grant all lands 
"reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated," at the time the line of the road 
was definitely fixed and a plat thereof filed in the General Land Office. The earliest 
definite location of any portion of the road was in November, l87l(Report of Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, 1873, p. 301). This was forthatportionof the road 
lying in Minnesota. The balance of the line has been definitely located since, at dif-
ferent dates. 
With reference to the first tract mentioned, viz, the laud lying between the Red 
River of the North and the James River in Dakota, it is admitted by t,he company and 
the records show that the road was completed through these lands within the time pre-
scribed. The proposed forfeiture does not affect them, and it is of course obvious thatt 
if they fell within the terms of the granting act, the Indian title was one which did 
not embarrass the company or call for any action on the part of the United States. 
With reference to other tracts mentioned none of them were lands to which the 
provisions referred to applied, for they were "reservations" and " appropriated" as 
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such at thP <lat<' of tlJf' (lt•linitl:' location of the road and were not therefor<> "aefplire<l 
in lw donation" hy thP company. They were exprPssly excepted from the donation 
b~· tl1P thir(l sPrtion of the act, and were not, therefore, lauds to which the provisioa 
u111ler eonsidrration, in any e\'cnt, applird. 
Thf' Sionx ReserYation in Dakota existed by virtue of Yarious treaties, from an 
early day to that of April ~9, 1868 (15 Stat., 635); the Crow Reservation in Montana 
was made by treaty of May 7, 1868 (15 Stat., 650. See al~-<o ExPcntive orders, October 
20, 187i, all(l May 8, 187u); the Cc.:enr d'Alene Reservation iu Idaho was made by 
Executive order of Jnuc 14, 1876; tile Yakirua by treaty of June 9, 1855 (1:! Stat.r 
p. 951), and the Pnyallnp by treaty of March 0, 1855 (10 Stat., 1132). They were all 
reserved lands at the date of the definite location of the road, and excepted from the 
grant and the undertaking of the "Cnited Statf's to <>xtinguish the title. They were 
also "approlJriated" and therefOI'e excepted. (See vVillcox vs. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498.) 
It thus appears that with reference to one of theAe tracts the road was completed 
without any necessity for aid from the United States within the time required; and 
that with reference to all the others, the United States has never been under any 
obligation to extingui!:lh the Indian title at all. 
But even if ~::~nch au olJligatiou existell, it is too clear for argument that it was th~ 
sole province of the UuiteJ. States to determine when and under what circumstance~ 
it should be discharged, consistently with public policy and the welfare of the Indian,;. 
Whatever may be individual views as to the policy of extinguislling these titles and 
the incidental effect upon tLe welf~Lre of the Iudiau!:l, it is entirely clear that Congress, 
by unequivocal laugnage, reservetl to the United States exclusively thH rigb.t to de-
tenuine that q nestion iu relation to these lauds . If she bas not determined that 
thrse titles can now he extinguislle<l con!:listently with public policy antl the welfare 
of the Indin111~, that elHls the controversy. Neither the company nor any one el~e can 
complain. 
The po~::~ition of the company upon this question amounts practically to a chtim th~tt 
the.\ were entttlrd to the as!:listauee of the treaty and war making power of the U11i1;eu 
Stat ... s whenever, in lmilding their road, thPy encountered opposition from tribes or 
roving bands of In<lians. Iu other words, that Congress not only uouatetl them 
48,000,000 acres of the public lauds, without limitation, restriction, or condition, JJnt 
also gave them the use of the treat~ -making lJOWer and the Army whenever a roving 
bnud of Indians interfer<>d with their work. Your committee decUne to adopt this 
view of the cnsf', and, on tlw contrary, are clearly of the opinion that CongJ'f'SS had 
no snch intent in the passage of the granting- act, and that no justification for ::mch a 
claim can be found in its tt'rms. 
Third. It is further claimetl that the United States has nut caused. the lauds along 
the line of the road to be surveyed as required by the act, for want of wbicll surveys 
"settlement is hindered an<l retarded, and the company is thereby prevt>nted from 
selling or realizing a11y benefit from its unsurveyed lands." 
Your committee are uuable to see, even if all this be true, how it in any way touches 
the question of the tluty of the company to construct its line within the rf'qnirPd time. 
But it is not trne that the United States is in default iu the matter. The proYisiou 
of the act referred to is as follows: 
"That the President of the United States shall cause the lands to be surveveu fol." 
40 miles in width on both sides of the entire line of said road, after the genera·] route 
shall be fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of saitl road.." 
(Sec. 6.) 
The question as to when the surve~·s should be ma<le, with reference to the con;;truc-
tion of the road, was left entirely to the discretion of the President. If be at any time 
decided that further surveys were not re<Iuired by the construction of the road, or that 
the surveys were prosecuted as fast as was necessary, then no right to further surveys 
existed in tl1e company. The lands, as your committee are adviAed, were survesed up 
to the time of the default in 1879 as fast as, in any reasonable judgment, was required, 
and we are satisfied tllat no inconvenience, from any delay in the surveys, retarded or 
prevented the completion of the roa,d. 
Fourth. It i!:l further contt>uded that the grant is not now forfeitable hecanse of the 
action of Congress in the passage of the act approved July 10, 1882 (22 R. Stat., 157). 
The granting act contained two donations affecting the public lands: first, a g-rant 
of" a right of way" through "public lands" (Sec. 21); second, the grant of lands 
contained in Aection 3. The two grants are entirely separate and distinct, made 
by two dift'Prent sections, and of two di1ferent estates. The former applied to all 
lands legally described as "public," the latter only to certain odd sections of such 
lauds not within named exceptions. Undf'r the former, the company had a right to 
buil!l its road across any ofsnch public lauds, and for that purpose had the nse of an 
ea<>ement in 200 feet on C'ach side of its track. Under the latter, it took in fee the 
dc::-ignated sections. Jnne 25, 1881, the road was located over the Crow Indian 
Reservation, already shown not to have been included in the granted lands. 
Thereupon, August 22, 1881, a treaty or agreement was entered into between certain 
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-special agents designated by the Secretary of the Interior on the one part and the 
Crow Indians npon the other, which agreement, so far as pertinent to the present in-
quiry, is as follows : 
·'Whereas by section one of an act of Congress approved July second, eighteen hun-
dred and sixty. four, entit.led "An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a 
railroad aud telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound, on the Pa.cific coast, 
by the northern route (thirteenth Statutes at Large, page three hundred and sixty-
five), the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was authorized and empowered to lay 
out, locate, construct, furnish, maintain, and enjoy a continuous railroad and tele-
graph line, with the appurtenances, namely: Beginning at a point on Lake Superior, 
in the State of Minnesota or Wisconsin ; thence westerly by tbe most eli~ible railroad 
route, as shall be determined by said company, within the t.-rritory of the United 
States, on a bne north of the forty-fifth degree of latitude, to some point on Puget 
Sound; and 
"Whereas by section two of said act of Congress granted to said company the 1·ight 
()j way for the construction of sa.id railroad and telegraph line to the extent of two 
hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass through the 
public domain, including all necessary ground for station buildings, workshops, depots, 
machine shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water stations; and 
"Wher~as, by said section two, Congress provhlcd that the United States should 
extinguish as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the 
Indians thfl Indian tit.Jes to all lands falling nuder the operation of this act and ac-
quired in the donation to the road named in the act; and 
"Whereas by treaty between the United States and the Crow Indians, concluded 
at Fort Laramie, May seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and duly ratified 
and proclaimed (fifteenth Statutes at Large, page six hundred and forty-nine), a dis-
trict of country in the Territory of Montana was set apart as a reservation for the 
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the said Indians; and 
"Whereas there is no provision or stipulation in said treaty authorizing said com-
pany or recognizing its right to cmastruct its road through said reservation ; and 
"Whereas the said company did, on the twenty-fifth day of June, eighteen hundred 
and eighty-one, file in the Department of the Interior a map showing the definite lo-
cation of its line of railroad from the one hundred and seventh degree of longitude 
west fron Greenwich westwardly through said reservation and adjacent territory to 
the western boundary to the said resPrve, as provided by said act of eighteen hun-
ored and sixty-four, the company having first obtained the permission of the Secre-
tary of the Interior to survey its line in said reservation; and 
" Whereas the said company oesires to construct its line of railroad upon such des-
ignated route, and claims the right by virtue of said act so to do: 
, "Now, therefore, in order to fulfill the obligations of the Government in the prem-
ises, this agreement · * * witnesseth: 
''That for the consideration hereinafter mentioned the Crow tribe of Indians do 
hereby surrender and relinquish to the United States all their right, title, and inter-
est in and to a.ll that part of the Crow Reservation situate in th~ Territory of Mon-
tana and described as follows, namely: 
"A strip of laud not exceeding 400 feet in width, that is to say, 200 feet on each side 
of the line laid down on the map of definite location hereinbefore mentioned, where-
ever said line runs through said reservation between tbe one hundred and seventh 
degree of longitude west of Greenwich on the east, and tbe mid-channel of the Big 
Boulder River on the west, containing five tbousand three hundred and eighty-four 
acres more or less. * * * 
"It is furtber stipulated and agreed that the United States will not pPrmit the said 
railroad company, its employes, or agents to trespass upon any part of the lands of 
the Crow Indian Reservation not hereby relinquisbed, nor permit said company, its 
employes, or agents to cut any timber, wood, or hay from tbe lands embraced in said 
reservation." 
July 10, 18tl2 (22 Stat., 157), Congress passed an act ratif) ing and confirming this 
agreement. 
The act first recited the agreement in extenso, and then provided as follows: 
"SEc. 3. That the right of way over the land relinquished by said agreement to 
the United States for the construction of said Northern Pacific Railroad, and tbe nse 
of the several parcels of land so relinquished intended to ue used for depots, stations, 
sidings, and so forth, for said railroad, are hereby granted to said Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company, its successors, and assigns, for the uses and purposes in aid 
agreement set forth." 
It is claimed that by these proceedings the United States waived the breach of con-
dition. 
As hereinbefore stated relative to another branch of the case, this argument is plaus-
ible but not sound. It ignores entirely the fact to which we have adverted, viz, tLat 
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the act contained two grants, one for tbe right of way and another in fee of the odd 
sections, and overlooks the fact that these proceedings related sol.ely to the former. 
The Crow treaty and act ratifying it are specifically limited to and operate only 
upon the right of way. This is shown beyond all question by a bare inspection of 
the statute. Neither the agreement nor the act contains a single word or expression 
that could be tortured into a recognition o;f the continued existence of the land grant 
or as a waiver of the forfeiture thereof. 
Their only scope and operation is to extinguish the Indian title for the purpose 
of making the right of way available. In this there is nothing whatever incon-
sistent with the idea of a forfeiture of the land grant and its declaratio!l at any time 
by Congress. 
The situation was anomalous. This munificent donation was then subject to for-
feiture for ureach of the condition. A due regard for the rights of the Government 
and its announced policy of dedicating the public lands for all time to come to actual 
settlers under general laws, demanded an enforcement of the forfeiture. But the 
<Jompany, pushing its line toward the Pacific, encountered difficulties at this point in 
respect to its right of way, not as to its grant of land, for, as already shown, it had 
no grant of lands on the reservation. No reasons of public policy demanded a for-
feiture of its right elf way, granted by the act as a separate and distinct concession; 
but, on the other hand, the most enlightened policy dictated its recognition. Hence 
Congress and the execnuive branch of the Government extinguished the Indian title 
as to the right of way, carefully limiting aU that was done to that one grant.. In 
this, as before stated, there was nothing, in the judgment of your committee, incon-
istent with a clear and well-defined intent to insist upon the breach of condition as 
to the grant of the odd sections in fee. 
The Indian title was the mere right of occupancy; protected by treaty or reserv:t-
tion it remained the same; in either event the landt3 were public lands of the United 
States. The United States did not grant these to the company, but expressly reserved 
and exempted them from its donation. It could and did, however1 give the company 
a right of way through them. Such right it would always give in a proper case. 
That the recognition of a former grant of that kind or even a new grant thereof can 
he considered as a waiver of breach of another grant, of a sepaeate and distinct 
~state, is, in the judgment of yonr committee, an untenable position. It would vio-
late the obvious intent of Congret3s, as shown in all its legislation affecting the grant, 
and leave this immense area of the public domain irrevocably consecrated to this 
.corporation, without restriction or control even to accomplish the simplest object of 
its creation. That Congress, by the act of 1882, intended any such result as that is 
beyond the credence of your committee. \Ve think it was intended merely to confirm 
the right of way, and that nothing in the proceedings taken for that purpose legally 
operated as a waiver of the reserved rights of the United States as to the grant of 
lands. 
The doctrine of implied wai,·er invoked by the company bas its foundation in prin-
ciples analogons to tho:->e of estoppel in pais. Tlw grantor, by virtue of something he 
bas said or dour, is, according to the justice or right of the matter, prohibited from 
asserting anything to the contrary. As betweel! individuals, occupying the position 
of grantor and grantee, in a, deed upon condition subsequent, it iH estoppel, pure and 
siwple, that enforces au implied waiv<>r of the breach; and, although estoppel cannot 
lw pleaded against the Go\·ernrnent, for the sake of the argument we may admit that 
the UnHed States, speaking and acting by its proper agents, might be placed in a 
position where in justice and equity it, should not den;y what it has before asserted to 
)le true. In every such case, however, the underlying principle is that of estoppel 
between inllividnals. If the circumstances would uot, between individuals, amount 
to an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, then a fortioTi the Government is nut 
liOtllld. 
Applying these critmia to the question noY'i' nuder consideration aucl it is entirely 
clear that there was no wmver of the breach. 
"An estoppel Ly matter in pais ffi<tY be detiued as au iudisputable admission, arising 
from the circumstanee that the party claiming the benefit of it has, while acting in 
good faith, been indnced, b)~ the voluntary intelligent action of the party against 
whom it is alleged, to change his position." (Bigelow on Estoppel, 2 ed., p. :345.) 
It is founded in the d.octrine of equity that if a representation he made to another, 
who deals upon the faith of it, the former shall make the representation good if he 
knew it to be fal ·e. (Bigelow on Est.oppel, p. 431; Evans vs. Bicknall, 6 Ves., 174, 182; 
Slim 1•s. Concher, 1 De G., :F. & .T., 518; Lee vs. Monroe, 7 Ch., 366.) 
To establish it, it is necessary to show uot only the fact of a misrepresent:,ltion or 
coneealment, but also that it was material to the interests of the part.y and actually 
misled him. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 4:31, 1 Story, Eq. Jur., par. 191.) 
All the following elements must be present in any transaction in order to create au 
e;,toppel by conduct: 
l. Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. 
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2. The repre8eutation must have been made with knowledge of the facts. 
3. The party claiming the estoppel must have been ignorant of the fact. 
4. The misrepresentation must have been made with intent that the other party 
should act upon it. 
5. The party claiming, must have been induced to act upon it. (Bigelow on Es-
toppel p. 437.) 
Hence, as a general rule, fraud is necessary to the existence of an estoppel by con-
duct. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 467.) 
In general, where there is nothing to show that a representation was intended to be 
acted upon as a statement of the truth or that it was tantamount to a promise or agree-
ment, amounting to an undertaking to respond in case of its falsity, the party is not 
estopped. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 486; Danforth VB. Adams, 29 Conn., 107; Farist's 
appeal, 39 Conn., 150; McAdams vB. Hawes, _9 Bush, 15; Zuchtmann vs. Roberts, 109 
Mass., 53; Kerhl VB. Jersey City, 8 C. E. Green, 84; Muller VB. Ponoir, 55 N.Y., 325;. 
Davis t'B. Smith, 4:3 Vt., 269.) 
And unless such a misrepresentation is in fact exclusively acted upon so that the 
position of the party is changed as to his ml\terial interests, there can be no estoppel. 
(Bigelow on Estoppel, pp. 49.2, 493; Howard VB. Huoson, 2 El. & B., 1; McCance VB. L. 
& N. W. R. R. Co., 7 Hurl. & N., 477; Schmaltz VB. Avery, 16 Q. B., 655; Boker VB. 
Johnston, 21 Mich., 3l9-:345.) 
Now, there was absolutely no misrepresentation whatever of any fact, material or 
immateri[~l, on the part of the Unitefl States; there was no intention to have the com-
pany do or omit to do anything whatever on account Qf any representations, false or 
true; there was no action whatever by the company induced by or founded upon any 
such representation; and the company has never in any respect changed its position 
to its prejudice. • 
Not one of the prerequisites of an estoppel by comlnct is to be found m the entire 
transaction. 
What was there in the transact,ion amounting to a fraud upon the company, or a 
promise amounting to an undertaking to make good any representation f 'Vhat bas 
the company done to change its position'? How has it been prejudiced'? 
One general rule can be deduced from all the authorities, viz, that unless one party 
to the transaction intends to make.some representation or extend some assurance and 
the other party to the transaction so understands, accepts, and acts, to his prejudice, 
then there is no estoppel. Your committee are entirely satisfied that in this transaction 
no such intention as waiving the breach of condition existed in the mind of Congress; 
that no such understanding of the position of Congress was entertained by the com-
pany; and, that instead. of doing anything to their prejudice in consequence of such 
proceedings, the company ol*tined new privileges and rights of great value. Under 
the very act which they now say estops the United States they lost nothing; did no 
act in consequence that prejudiced them in the least; and, on the. other hand, secured 
the right of way across the reservation. It is thus clear that, treated even from the 
standpoint of an estoppel, there was no waiver of the breach of condition. 
To conclude, we refer to the following principles and authorities showing that mere 
indulgence or silence cannot be construed into a waiver of a breach of condition. 
(Gray VB. Blanchard, tl Pickering, 284, 292; Washburn, section 19.) Laches cannot be 
imputed to the Government or its officers (7 Otto, 584), and especially "in a repre-
sentative Government where the people do not and cannot act in a body, where their 
· power is delegated to others, and must be exercised, if at all." (8 Otto, 489; to same 
effect, see 9 Wheaton, 720; 11 Wheaton, 184; 4 McLean, 567; 5 McLean, 133; 1 Peters, 
318 ; 8 Wallace, 269-27 4 ; 5 Otto, 316.) 
VIE"rs OF THE ~fLNORITY. 
I desire to add a few words to the foregoing in respect to m."T owu iu-
dividual views upon one of the legal propositions argued by the major-
ity of the committee since the preparation of the report to the Forty-
eig·htb Congress b~7 the Public Lanus Committee. I have looked ,·ome-
wbat further i11to the precise nature of the grant made by Congrei'~ to 
this company, and I am by no means clear that said grant was one in 
prccsenti upon condition subsequent. On the contrary there is much to 
be said in favor of the proposition that the same is uot a present grant, 
but is oue upon condition precedent, and that the legal title still re-
mains in tb(:l United States Government. lu l':upport of this conten-
tion I mig·ht cite the case of the United States agaiust Childersl re-
ported in 8th Sawyer, U. S. Circuit Reports, uiuth circuit, 
The Public Lauds Committee, in the reports heretofore made to the 
House of Hepresentatives upon the various land-forfeiture bil1s that 
haYe be(•n submitted to it, has uniformly taken the position that the 
grant is one in praesenti and upon condition subsequeut. I do not care 
at the present time to Puter into a discussion of that question. To my 
mind there is a wide distinction between the language employed iu this 
act aud the one employed in the grant of June 3, 1856 (11 Stats., p. ~0), 
which was the act under consideration in the case of Shulenberg against 
Harriman (~1 vVallace, p. 44), where-in that act was held to be a present 
grant. The language of that act, which was a grant to the State of 
Wisconsin, was "that there be and is hereby granted." which of itself 
was evideutly intended to operate as an alienation of the fee of the prQp-
erty. This is quite plain from the fact that in the vVisconsin act there 
is no provision for the issuance of patents to the lauds, nor are there 
any words which could be construed to restrain or limit the operation 
of the words of the present grant; but in the Northern Pacific graut, 
while the words "there be aud is hereby granted" are used, sectiuu 4: 
of the act proYides for the conveyance of tlle lands as each section of 
25 miles of the road is contructed and accepted by the grantor, and 
then there is a subsequent provision for the issuance of patent. The 
peculiarity of this language is quite sufficient in my judgment upon 
which to base a Yery persuasive argument to the effect that it was not 
intended that the i>resent title to the lands in this grant. should pass 
until after the issuauce of -patent. 
In Uice t'S. Railway Company (1 Black, page 358) the question was 
couside'red as to the e:ffect of an act donating lands to the Territory of 
Minnesota to aid in the construction of a raHway iu wllich the wor<ls 
"there is hereby granted'' are used. TlJere was a subsequeut provision 
for the issuance of patent upon the completion of 20-mile section of the 
road. The court there held tllat the preseut title to the lands did uot 
pass until the completion and acceptance of the road and the issuance 
of patent. However, I do not propose to enter into any further discus-
sion on this subject, but simply place upon record these few observa-
tions in order that the fact of my making this report for the committee 
may not be construed as acquiescence of the soundness of the proposi-
tion that the grant under cousideratiou is one in ]Jrcesenti. 
BARCLAY HENLEY. 
(13) 
Mr. STRAIT, from the Committee on the Public Lands, snbmitted the 
following 
VIEWR OF THE MINORITY: 
The undersigned, members of the Committee on Public Lands, dissent 
from the report made by the majority of said committee on the bill (H. 
R. 147) to forfeit certain lands granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad 
Company. 
Inasmuch as our examination of the facts and our view of the law 
have led us to the same general conclusions reached by the minority of 
the Committee on Public Lands in the Forty-eighth Congress on a bill 
of similar import, we adopt as our owu, in the maiu, the views then 
submitted by said minority, with some changes in the figures, to suit 
the changed condition of affairs since that report was prepared. 
Said minority report is as follows : 
The bill declares the grant of land approved July 2, 1864, by the GoveromPnt of the 
United States to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, forfeited as to ~Lll of said 
grant except the lands coterminons with that portion of the railroad which had been 
constructed on and prior to July 4, 1tl79; i. e., it declares forfeited all of said lands 
west of the Missouri River, except a part of the Western Oregon division. 
During the late war commnnication between the Government authorities at Wash-
ington and the people of t.h.e Pacific slope was, owing ~o the state of the country which 
then existed, the great distance to be traveled, and the intervention of numerous 
hostile Indian tribes, almost impossible. It bas been said with much truth that but 
for the regular trips to California by the overland stage line the credit of the Gov-
ernment would have sunk out of sight. But the energy of IIalliday, who, to avoid the 
!IHli:ms, found for his coaches an open prairie route 300 or 400 miles south of the direct 
and usual line of travel, brought through large amounts of gold and silver which 
could not be risked by sea, in consequence of the danger of capture by Confederate 
pri-vateers. 
This so forcibly illustrated the necessity for a transcontinental railway and tele-
graph line, to place the East a"!ld seat of Government in closer communication with 
the rich gold-bearing Pacific coast, that on July 1, 18G2, au act was passed by Con-
gress providing for the construction of a railroad from the Missouri River to the Pacific 
Ocean, which resulted in the building of the Union and Central line. 'rhis, like every 
other wise and great act of statemanship, excited a spirit of emulation, at all times 
liable to abuse and often dangerous, which culminated in chartering and subsidizing 
three other Pacific railroads, with numerous and extensive connections. 
Tl!e Northern Pacific was the next in order of time, and ~bile no such necessity 
existed for its construction as influenced the chartering of the Union and Central, yet 
there were considerations of no small moment in its favor as well as against it. The 
country it was to traverse was-the greater part of it-barren mountains, bleak 
prairies, or a wilderness inhabited by ·wild and hostile Indians, whose murderous in-
cursions and depredations for hnndreds of miles eastward, upon white frontier set-
tlers, cost the Government annually a large amount of money to keep a sufficient 
force of troops to repel and pnnish thf' marauders. Besides, the building of the road 
from Lake Superior to Puget Sound would add to the already vast resources of the 
country untold mineral and agricultural wealth. The road would increase immigra-
tion from the Old World, a very desirable thing at tha.t day, however questwnable 
the policy now. Two or three generations hence, all the lands of America will be de-
manded for Americans. 
The war was still flagrant and the minds of the people then controlliug the Govern-
ment highly inflamed agairst Great Britaiu on account of the sympathy there man-
ifested for the Southern Confederacy and nowhere within Her Majesty's dominions 
more than in the Canadas. Lake Superior, at their doors, is a great inland sea sur-
rounded by prosperous cities and varied industries. Puget Sound, likewise on or near 
the dividing line, is the finest harbor on the Pacific coast, not excepting San Fran-
cisco and San Diego. It was, therefore, at the time the Northern Pacific Company 
(14) 
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was chartered and tbe grant of land made, but a just anticipation of and strategic-
movement against Great Britain both for purposes of war and commerce. A verifi-
cation in part of these apprehensions is now found in the Canadian Pacitic Railroad 7 
more than 700 miles of which is already constructed. 
Ou the other hand, thtJ early termination of the war took out of it the national neces-
sity for chartering the company and making the grant, and the subsequent exten-
sion, instead of repealing the ~rant before any work was done, was perhaps nnwise7 
as it gave an impetus to a sentiment, generated by one great and popular act, which 
soon grew into such a craze that nearly 20,000,000 of acres of the pnulic domain were 
given to these soulless corporations upon which to grow fat, in~:~olent, and regardless 
of the rights of the common people. 'fhe policy went to itA utmost verg~, and now 
turns back upon itself. At last the danget· of land monopoly is seen; the people in 
many instance;~ appeal to tlte Government for relief from corporation power and op-
pi·ession. Their repreAentatives are not nnmindful of their complaints. 
Now, the great question for statesmen to solve is, "What shall be done f" Shall we 
follow the beckoniugs of" t.he blunt monster with uncounted heads, the self-discord-
ant waviug multitude," over tlle brink antl into the billows of confiscation and com-
munism, or shall we, like philosophers, if not as statesmen, make the most of a batl 
bargain by faithfully adhering to it and the law. which should be the master of us all t 
Give a patient hearing to all, decide impartially, and legislate accordingly. \Ve think 
the latter course preferable, and herein endeavor to follow it. We cannot. if we 
would, dig up yesterday. And the good faith of the Government to all of its citizens 
must be maintained. 
The enthusiasm and impatience of American character were displayed in section 8 
of the granting act, which prescribed July 4, 1876-the ceniennial ye::tr-only twelve 
yean~, for the construction of a railroad :2_,200 miles long, over impassable mountains~ 
across difficult and treacherous rivers, through a country inhabited only by savagt>s. 
ContrarJ to legislative expectation, grPat difficulty was enconHtered in rai~:~ing suffi-
cient money to uegin the construction, and by various enactments the time to begin 
the work was extended to July, 1l:l70, and the time finally fixed for the completion of 
the wllole road was July 4, 1879, a period of only seven years. The company was 
required to construct 100 miles per anmun as the minimum after the first two years; 
yet it will be seen that the construction mnst have averag~d over 300 miles a year to 
have been completed within the time allowed. 
The company began work and constructed four hundred and twenty-five ( 425) miles 
of road to the Missouri River by 1tl73, when the financial panic set in, anti the com-
pany was unable to proceed furtller until after July 4. 1879. The old company utterly 
failed in 1875, and a new one had to be organized before the work could be resumed. 
The new or reorganized company have constructed their saiu road to \Vallula Junc-
tion, 214 miles east of Portland; also its road from Portland to Puget Sound, a dis-
tance of 14G miles, and about 1J7 miles on the Cascade branch, aggregating some-
thing over 2,000 miles of completed road, all of which have been mspected and ac-
cepted by commissioners appointed by the President, under the fourth section of the 
granting act. Fourteen years have not elapsed since the construction was begun;: 
the company have, therefore, averaged about 140 miles per annum, which we think 
evidences a commendable effort and earnest.ness to complete the road, considering the 
difticulties encountered, which are hereinafter further set forth. 
The sole ground upon which the forfeiture is claimed by the majority is that the 
whole road was not completed by July 4, ltl79. 
Now, we invite attention to the character of tbe act approved Jnly 2, 18fJ4, which 
constitutes the charter, franchise, or contract of the company, as well as the law of 
the case. The thinl section grants to the company a present estate in these words: 
"That there be, and hereby is, granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 
its successors and assign~, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad 
and telegraph line to the Pacific coast, and to secure the safe and speedy transporta-
tion of the mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores over the route of said 
line of railway, every alternate section of publie land, not mineral, designated by odd 
numbers, to tlle amount of twenty alternate sections per mi.le, on each side of such 
railroad line, as said company may adopt, tllrough the Territories of the United States, 
and ten alternate sections of land per mile on each side of said railroad when~ver it 
passes through any State." * * * 
This language shows that the grant passed the title to the lands to the company. 
It shows, too, very largely the consideration which induced it. The majority of the 
committee claim, however, that the eighth section made the grant an estate on con-
dition subsequent, for a breach of which a forfeiture may be asserted. That section 
is in these words, to wit : 
"SEC. 8. That each and every grant, right, and privilege herein are so made and given 
to and accepted by said Nortllern Pacific Railroad Company, upon and subject to the 
following conditions, namely: That the said company shall commence the work on said 
road within two years from the approval of this act by the President, and shall com-
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plete not less than :fifty miles per year after the second year, and shall construct, equip, 
furnish, and complete the whole road by the fourth day of July, anno Domici eight-
een hun(lred and seventy-six." 
\Ve admit that this section standing alone would make it a grant in presenti with 
conditions subsequent, for the breach of which the grautor would have a right to de-
clare a forf, iture. · Bnt section 9 is in the following words: 
"f'EC. 9. That the United States make the several comlitional grants herein. and 
that the said Korthern Pacific Railroad Company accept, the same upon the further 
condition that i£ the said company make any breach of the conditions hereof, and 
allow the t-ame to continue for upward of one year, then, in such case, at any time 
hereafter; the United States by its Congress may do any and all acts and things which 
ruay be needful and necessar~r to insure a speedy completion of the said road." 
Thf> majority of the committee treat the conditions expressed in this ninth section 
as ueing for the benefit of the Government, notwithstanding the unambiguous lan-
guage that the United States make the grants herein, and the company "accept the 
same upon the further condition," &c. 
It will be ol>served that. the acceptance by the company was also npon condition, viz, 
that in case of breach one year ~:>hould be allowed to repair it, and if the company failed 
to repair the breach of condition within the year, ''the United States, by its Congress, 
may do any and all acts and things which may be needful aud necessary to insure the 
opeedy completion of the said road." It does not say that the land shall revert. This 
language was not employed meaninglessly. In all the previous grants of laud made by 
Congress to aid in the construction of railroarls the condition was clearly set forth, as 
well as the penalty for a breach and words of reverter or forfeiture conspicuously set 
forth. They were therefore estates at the comm n law where the gr:.tutor might re-
enter for condition broken. (Shulingburg t•s. Harryman, 21st ·wallace, p. 44.) 
But here, instead of the grantee accepting au estate of that character as tendered by 
the act, dowu to and including the eighth section, the company placed a condition upon 
its acceptance which, being agreed to, madt' it a part of the contract. It was expressi\'e 
<>f the purpose of Congress to dedicate the lands granted, in any contingeucy and irrev-
ocably, to insure the speedy completion of saitl road; and ~Ll though Congress may not 
have snccePded in its purpose and which opens a field of discussion npon whi ch it is not 
necessary for us to enter, it is, however, clear to the minds of the minority that the ac-
ceptance hy the company, upon its conditions, so changed the character of the eRtate 
granted that it was not a common-law forfeitable estate for ureach of condition. An es-
tate upon condition, certainly-but in lieu of the con<lition, the l>reach of which at the 
<lommon law made the estate forfeitable, a statutory penalty or reservation is retained 
by the grantor, which it may exercise in any manner consistent with the 1·eservations 
set forth in said section 9 and in section 20 of said act. 
A common-law estate upon condition subsequent, wherein aforfeituremaybedeclared 
for breach of condition, must be one upun which the grantor has the right to enter as 
soon as the breach occurs, and being in is reinvested with his :first estate. And if the 
grantor accepts a stipulation that be will not, in case of breach, enter until after one 
year ha been allowed the grantee to perform the condition, the estate becomes absolute, 
and the gra.ntor is put to his action, or whatever other redress his contract gives him, for 
to retake the estate by forfeiture he cannot. Aga.in, the estate granted is apportionaule, 
and the doctrine of forfeiture, wherein the grantor receives l>ack or is reinvested of the 
identical estate granted, is not applicable. 
Just here we adopt the language of the Supreme Court in the sinking-fund cases in 
respect to this grant: ''Neither is it to the purpose now to questiOn the wisdom or policy 
of the new departure taken in the case of the gra.nt for the Northern Pacific Railroad. 
In the determination of legal rights to permit present v iewR and opinions of the wi sdom 
or unwisdom of the legislators who enacted the law to affect the jnd~ment wonld be 
misleading and dangerous." If the con(litions r eferred to in sections 8 and 9 make the 
land granted a forfeital>le estate, every other grant, right, mHl }_Jri vi lege conferred upon 
the company-its corporate franchi:ses-and ~tll its rights au(l pow!~rs arc in like manner 
forfeitable tor 1Jreach of any of the conditions, for there is no <1 istinctiouma<le, expressed 
or implied, in the act. If these are not forfeitable the lands cannot be. (Hughes t•s. 
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company and others, 18 Federal H.eportcr, lOG and 108.) 
If, however, we concede, which we do not, that the grant was of an estate on coudi-
tion, for the breach of which a forfeiture could have l>een declared, does that fact jnstify 
the report of the committee' \Ve hold that it does not, for the reason that, on wen-
settled principles, both of law and equity, the Government has waiv<'d the right of for-
feiture, if it ever existed. The thing which remains with mul resides in the grantor of 
an e~:>tate in prcesenti with condition sul>sequent is in no sense property or estate, and is 
not the subject of sale or transfer; it is a thing in action dependent upon a contingency, 
the happening of which, the breach of the condition, is necessary to raise it to the 
dignity of a right; while the grantor takes an estate which he may sell or mortgage, 
.and which will pass as an inheritance subject only to the condition. If, therefore. 
the grantor does an act inconsistent with that right, while in either the iucohate or 
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perfect state, it is thereby waived or lost. Mere silence or inaction when it is not the 
duty of the gra.ntor to speak or act is not a bar, but eo converso, when condnct or si-
lence is misleading. (Nicoll vs. New York and Erie Railroad Company, 12 N.Y. Rep., 
137; Marks vs. Marks, 10 Modern; Brooks vs. Martin, 43 Ala., 360.) 
"We concerle that this great Government has the physical power to disregard th'3 
right and to do anything it pleases, but such has never been its course in dealing 
with its citizens, and so long as just men and enlightened statesmen control its coun-
cils and tribunals it never will be admiiJistered, in any of its departments, upon the 
monarchical principle that, like the king, it can do no wrong, and is bound by no ob-
ligation but its own sovereign will. This, then, being a Government of law, it will 
ever set a good example and bind the citizens more strongly to it by itself obeying 
the law. 
Now, wherein bas the Government of the Uniteu States, as grantor in this case, 
waived or prevented the performance of the condition? 
1. By the joint resolution of Congress, approved May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. at Large, 
378), the Government, with a knowledge of the inability of the company to con-
struct the road, and before any of it was constructeu, authorized it "to issue its 
bonds to aid in the con truction and equipment of its road and to secure tbe same by 
mortgage on its property and rights of property of all kinds and descriptions, real, 
personal, and mixed, including its franchises as a corporation." Anu in the proviso 
it declares: 
That all lands hereby granted to said company which shall not be sold or disposed 
of or remain subject to the mortgage by this act authorized, at the expiration of five 
years after the completion of tne entire road, shall he subject to settlement and pre-
emption like other lands at a price to be paill to said company not exceecling $~.50 
per acre; an<l if the mortgage hereby anthorized stall at any time be enforced by 
foreclosure or other legal proceeding, or the mortgaged lands hereby granted, or any 
of them, be sold by the trustees to whom such mortgage may be executed, either at 
its maturity or for any failure or default of said company under the terms thereof, 
such lands shall be sold at public S(tle, at places within the States and Territo1'ies in which 
they shall be situate, after not less than sixty days' p1·erious notice, in single sections or 
subdivisions the1·ec>.f, to the highest and best bidder. 
Under this authority there were $:30,000,000 of bonds sold and the proceeds used in 
the construction of the road to the Missouri River, which were refunded in prderred 
stock of the company; and in the extension of the road by the new or reorganized 
company, $25,000 per mile of bonds have been issued and sold and t!Je procee(ls used 
for pnrposes of construction and equipment. Thus more than 2,000 miles of roa.d 
which have been completed, inspected, and accepted by the executive branch of the 
Government, with the lands, have been place(l nuder first mortgagt>, aggregating 
$50,000,000. Besides, they have issued and sold $18,000,000 of second-mortgage bonds, 
making in all now outstanding in t.he hands of purchasers for value, about $6~,000,000. 
These bonds are secured by a mortgage upon the property of the company, including 
. the lauds. The sanction of the Government by the joirit resolution ~as inconsistent 
with its right as grantor to afterwards declare a forfeiture, and the right was thereby 
lost or suspevded. (Sheppard's Touchstone, 121; Fletcher t•s. Peck, 6 Crauch, 87, 
135-137; McCravy vs. Remson, 19 Ala., 480.) 
If we add to the above the :;:;:30,000,000 and accrued interest, in payment of which 
preferred stock in the rcorganizNl company was taken, we have near one hundred 
millions of indebtedness, secured by lien, legal and equitable, on the eornpany'A prop-
erty and the land. 
In the second sect.ion, Congress reserved to itself only the right to alter or amenll 
and not to repeal the joint resolution, having due regard for the rights of the com-
pany and other patties, which means, of course, the bondholders. What right has 
Congress to declare a forfeiture of these lands where the roads has been constructed f 
To do so would be an act of bad faith bordering on repudiation. (Sheppard's Touch-
stone, 121; 95 U.S. Rep., 319; 6 Cranch, 135-1:37; 13 Gray, 239-253.) 
If tbe forfeiture recommended by the committee is adopted, and their bill passed, 
it will take from the company the lands granted coterminous with nearly 1,500 miles 
of constructed road; and the grantor (the United States) will not be reinveRted with 
the title of its former estate, which was a wilderness filled with savages, but will be 
reinvested with title to its lands increased in value tenfohl, a great line of railway 
through them, and an intelligent white population instead of the savages. And thes'e 
are but a part of the absurd consequences to which the doctrine of the committee 
would lead us. 
2. The grantor st\pulated, in section 6 of the charter, that as soon as the general 
route was fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of said railroad 
the President of the United States shall cause the lands to be surveyed, &c. ; whil~ 
section 4 declares "that whenever the ,. ~ " company shall have twenty-five 
consecutive miles of said roa<;t ,. " ready for the service," &c., the Presiclen 
should appoint commissioners to inspect the same, and if they report faYorably, tha 
H. Rep. 1226-2 
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thereupon patents to land coterminous with the completed section should issue to 
said company. 
By a proviso to a clause in an appropriation bill approved July 15, 1870, Congress 
prohibHed the issning of any patent to the company until they first paid to the Gov-
~rnmf'nt the cost of surveying and conveying the lands, a requirement which should 
have been in the charter or grant, but which was not in it. It was, therefore, a new 
burden imposed, and a violation of the contract. This occurred before there was any 
"breach of conditions by' the company. 
3. The grantor agreed to clear the right of way of Indians to enable the grantee to 
construct its road. The grantor alone bad the power to do that. It was not done, 
a.nd many of the surveying part,ies of the company were killed while endeavoring to 
select a route for said road. What was the condition of the country through which 
said road has subsequently been built prior to July, 1879f Let the commanding offi-
vers of the United States Army tell. General Brisbin, commanding at Fort Keogh, 
wrote from that place under elate of April 23, ll:li::l2, as follows: 
"I mention these incidents to show you the condition of the Yellowstone country 
:prior to 1877. It was so unsafe that not less than 1,000 armed men conld penetrate it 
without suffering great risk. I advised the delay or abandonment of the survey for 
the Northern Pacific Railroad because we had not sufficient men to make the country 
safe. These brave fellows were several times attacked, aud I expected they would 
be massacred." 
General Gibbon, April 27, 181::!2, wrote: 
"From 1870, wben I first went to Montana, till 1876, that whole region (between 
:Mandan, Dak., and Bozeman, Mont.) was an almost unknown wilderness, where it 
was not safe for any but large and well organized parties of white men to go. Eu-
uineer parties had upon all occasions to be well protected with troops, and even after 
the establishment of Forts Keogh and Cnster, in 1876-'77, the bauds of roving, hostile 
Jndians rendered engineering operations along the line of the Northern Pacific Rail-
way hazardous." 
On same date General Terry, commanding the department, wrote from Fort Snell-
ing: 
"I came into command in this department in January, 1873. From that time up to 
the beginning of 1877 it wohld have been impossible to make surveys in the valley of 
the Yellowstone from the mouth of the river to the western part of the Crow Reser-
vation, except under tho. protection of a very large escort of troops. That portion of 
the- valley of which I have spoken has been constantly overrun by hostile Sioux, and 
even with a powerful escort J3Urveys could have been prosecuted only at a very great 
disadvantage." 
Under such circumstances, we think that the company bas done all that a reasona-
able Government could expect or require. The condition wa8 one which it was im-
yossible to perform within the time required. It was rendered impossible by the fail-
ure of the grantor to keep its part of the contract. There was therefore no breach of 
condition. (2"Blackstone's Com. (by Cooley), 156, note 11; 4 Kent's Com., 129, 130; · 
Coke~s Ins., ~06b, 2209a; Sheppard's Touchstone, 133; United States vs. Maca, 18 
Howard, p. 557; United States vs. Reading, 18 Howard, 1.) 
4. In the second section of the granting act is found these words: 
"The United States sball extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public 
policy and the welfare of the said Indians, the Indian titles to all lands falling under 
the operation of this act and acquired in the donation of the road named in this bill." 
When the engineers and construction men reached the Crow Reservation in Mon-
tana, they were stopped by the Indian agent and threatened witb the military force 
if they entered, and thus they were halted until the treaty of 1882. 
On the lOth day of July, 1882, while a bill was pending before Congress for the 
iodeiture of the land granted to this company, the Congress passed an act (22 Stat. 
L., p. 157) ratifying an agreement or treaty made with the Crow Indians, securing 
from them the right of way through their reservation, and consisting of upwards 
of 5,000 acres of laud, which said act declared "are hereb~7 granted to said North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company " * * for the uses and purposes in said agree-
ment set forth." One of the uses set forth was "for the construction of said North-
ern Pacific Railroad." This was, in our opinion, au absolute waiver of the condition 
:insisted on by the majority of the committee as cause for forfeiture. An act of for-
feiture would be tantamount to an attempt at confiscat.ion. This act, if the grant 
was an estate upon condition, dispensed with the ·condition and made the estate ab-
solute. (Ludlow vs. N. Y. & Harlem River R. R. Co., 12 Barb.; Willard vs. Alcott, 2 
N.H., 121; Andrewsvs. Lenter, 32Maine, 395; Chalkervs. Chalker, 1 Conn., 79; Hnme 
n. Kent, 1 Ball & B., 554.) The company on the 19th day of Augui'lt, 11:!82, filed its 
Mceptance in writing of the terms and conditions thereof, and on the 23d day of An-
knst, 1882, paid to the Treasurer of the United States the $:25,000 required by section 3 
of the said act of July 10, 1882. 
If the bill reported by the majority becomes a law, it presents the anomaly of ·for-
FORFEITED GRANTS NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD. 19 
feiting the land granted to the greater portion of the road, not for the failure to build, 
because the road is already built, but for the failure to build within the time prescribed 
in the granting act. Who demands such forfeitures? Certainly not the people of the 
United States, nor any very considerable portion of them, for if so-if it be feared 
that this and other great corporations are to own so much of the lauds that the peo-
vle cannot acquire them, why should not Congress, by law, limit to a much smaller 
numher the eight hundred thousand immigrants, among whom are thousands of pau-
pers and criminals, annually flocking to our shores in quest of homes? The question-
ahle policy of giving the public domain to homestead settlers, instead of retaining it 
as a source of revenue, has existed now for more th1m twanty years, and bas opened 
the flood-gates of immigration from all the world. The time is, we predict, rapidly 
approaching when thi policy will be reversed. 
But suppose you forfeit these lands and return them to the public domain, what 
will you do with them? Give them to actual settlers is the response. Stimulate 
foreign immigration still higher, as though au overcrowded population was a desira-
ble thing for future generations to enjoy. The only demands, coming directly from 
the people, for the forfeit.ure of the lands of the Northern Pacific Company, come from 
a part only of the settlers within the limits of the grant. What is the probable cause T 
Have all the Government lands heen taken up, and does this company exact such ex-
orbitant prices for its la,nds as to render them ina,ccessihle? It was unfortunate that 
the granting act did not put a limit on the price at which the company should sell, 
but it did not. While that was not the fault of the company, but of Con~ress, it is 
a privilege quite certam to be abused, if it has not already been. The offiCial report 
of land sales made by the company up to Jnne 30, 1883, however, do not show that 
they had exacted exorbitant or unreasonable prices for their lands. Four million 
five hundred and thirty-nine thousand seven hundred and forty-three acres had been 
sold for $15,f)93,156-au average of ttbout $3.43t per acre-a little less than $1 above 
the GoYernment price for the f'ven-numbered sections within the limits of the grant. 
Who knows what the public mind is? These great corporations are here, by their 
agents and attorneys, using their influence against the whole policy of forfeitures on 
the one hand, while upou tbe other are numerous shystert;, speculators, and lobbyists 
in the guise of patriots and representatives of the people, urging Congress to forfeit 
the lands granted to every railroad where there is the slightest pretext for it. Cast-
ing about us to discover the mainspring of action of t,his seemingly disinterested class, 
we find m the eighteenth volume of Statutes at Large, page 519, an act of Congress 
approved March 3, 1875, in these words: 
"That where any actual settler who shall ha\'e paid for any lands situate within 
the limits of any grant of lauds by Congress to aiel in the constrnction of any railroad, 
the price of such lands being fixed by law at double minimum rates, a,ncl such rail-
road lands having been forfeited to the United States and res~ored to the public do-
main for failure to build such railroad, such person or persons shall have the right to 
locate, on an~' unoccnpied lan(ls, au equal amount to their original entry, without 
further cost, except such fees as are now provided by law in pre-emption ca,ses." 
It is probable that a knowledge of the existence of this law is the cause of much of 
the clamor that is raised a,long the line of this important road for a forfeiture of its 
lauds. In that event every person who ha,s entered land at donble minimum any-
where within 20 llliles of the road on either side in the Territories or within 10 miles 
on either side in the States through which tile road runs, as well as within those 
limits where the road haiil not been constructed, would, if a forfeiture were declared 
as recommended by the majority, htwe the right, nuder this law of 1875, "to locate, 
on any unoccupiecl lan(l8, an equ(tl amou,nt to thl:'ir otiginal entry without jltrthet cost." 
If those who would fall within this la,w sa.w proper they could "locate" upon any 
unoccupied laud in any Sta,te or Territory of the United Sta,tes. This would give 
rise to another class of la.ntl scrip and open another fiehl for specnhttion and rnthles 
jobl>ery. 
This law of 1 '75 was intended to apply to entries made at the double minimum of 
82.50 per acre within the limits of withdrawal for [L projected railroad which is never 
built and the lands forfeited ''for fail nrc to bnil(l" the road. The proposition of the 
<.:ommittec i' to forfeit, "for failure to bnild" within the timo limited, the lanrls lying 
alongside of 1,500 miles of road ·which has actually been built a.IHl is now in operation, 
thereby bringiug the settlers all along tlutt line within the provisions of the LHv of 
1875. In this, tb,tt law wonld receive a most odious anu unjust npplication. It offers 
to donl>le each man's rea.! estate along the line of every laud-grant rai !road, if he ha 
purcllase(l at the double minimum, and can iJl(Jnce Congress to declare a forfeiture. 
Congress did not apprehend that the statute woul(l ever find such a field of operation, 
for the simple rea::.OI_t tlutt no one in Congress then had eYer concen'eu the idea of de-
claring forfeited the lauds grantecl to .a railro[td company after it had actually built 
Its road merely because it was not bnilt strictJJ· within the time limited in the grant. 
Snch a course finds no warrant in the law, anrt leads to absurd consequences. 
Keeping steadily in view the great object which the Government, in making the 
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grant, intended to accompiisb, viz, the speedy constrnction of a transcontinental line 
of railway from Lake Superior to Puget Sound, parallel with and north of the forty-
fifr,h degree of north latitude, we find-
(1) That the eleventh section of the granting act declares that the railroad shall 
be a post-route and military road for tbe use of the Government, and subject to such 
regulations as Congress may impose restricting its charges for Government transpor-
tation . 
(2) That the latter part of section 4 of the granting act, under a proviso, declares. 
''That lands shall not he grante(l, under the provisious of this act, on account of an!}' 
railroad, or pw·t the1·eoj, constructed at the date of tlze passage of this act." And a part 
of the proviso to the fi.ftb section authorizes t,he company to form running connections. 
with other companies on fair and equitable terms. The company have forrned a run-
ning connection-control and operate the railroad of the Oregon Rail way and Naviga-
tion Company from Wallula Junction to Portland, in the State of Oregon, a distance 
of 214 miles, which forms an important link in the connection between the eastern 
and w·estern portions of the Northern Pacific Railroad. We learn that the lease or 
running arrangement is of a continuing or permanent character, at least for a great 
period of time. Now w~ are of opinion that the compauy are not entitled to the lands 
coterminous with the 214 miles of the Oregon Railway a,nd Na,·igation Company. 
It is not the purpose or in tent of the granting act to give lands to tbe company on 
account of a road const1·ucted, for th ,elanguage is that'' there be and hereby is g1·ante£l 
to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, for the purpose of aiding in the constt·uction 
of said railroad," &c. 
The intent,iou of Congress is to be gathered from the entire act, and, in fact, from 
all the legislatiOn upon the subject. In construing a legislative grant, no presump-
tions are to be indulged• against the grantor, as in the case of individuals. The 
grantee must show his right in unambiguous terms. (Grand Lodge vs. Waddill, 36 
Ala.; United States 1JS. Railroad Co., 1 Black.) 
Can the Northern Pacific Company retain title to theRe lands along the Columbia. 
River from vVallula Junction to Ps:Jrtlancl on account of a roacl which it found t,here 
constructed and acqnired by lease' We rlo not uuderstand that the Nort.heru Pacific 
is making any effort to construct their road to fill this gap. Indeed, there is no ne-
cessity for paralleling the line which they have leased. If the company is not en-
titled to hold these lands-and we hold they are not-it is the right and duty of the 
United States to resume the title and restore them to the public domain. There is no 
ground of forfeiture, for we have seen- that that character of estate was not granted. 
But we hold that under the resenations of the 9th and 20th sections of the granting 
act and the right of eminent domain as lord paramount, the Government of the United 
States may, through its Congress and by statutory- enactment, resume the title to the 
lands granted coterminous with the said leaEed road from Wallula Junction to Port-
land. · 
·Substantially, the object and purpose which Congress had in view in 
making the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company have been 
attained, namely, "The construction of said railroad and telegraph line 
to the Pacific coast, and the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, 
troops, and munitions of war over the route of said railway" (section 2 
o{ the act). The road is now complete from Lake Superior to Tacoma, 
on the. Pacific Ocean, all of which has been built ·and equipped by said 
company, save that portion from Wallula to Portland, through the Co-
lumbia River Valley, a distance of 214 miles, where there is a road owned 
by the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, but now used by the 
Northern Pacific Railway Uompauy under contract and arrangement 
with the former company. 'l'he main line, therefore, is a continuous 
road from the northern lakes to the Pacific Ocean . 
On the Cascade branch, 50 miles eastwaJ.td from Tacoma and 87 miles 
westward from Pasco, on the main line, have been completed, examined 
by Government commissioners, accepted by the President; and 40 miles 
more are now under construction in the Yakima Valley, which will soon 
be finished and read~y for examination ; and when this is done there will 
be left but 75~ miles, including the tunnel of 1.9 miles, to finish the Cas-
cade branch. The contract for the construction of the tunnel has been 
made and the work is progressing. 
In consonance, therefore, with the facts and our views of the la~ and 
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the equities of the case, we report the accompanying bill, and ask that 
it be printed, as we will offer it as a substitute for the bill of the com-
mittee. 
H. S. V .AN EATON. 
H. B. STRAIT. 
I. STEPHENSON. 
A BILL to resume the title to a portion of the lands granted to theN" orthern Pacific Railroad Company, 
and to repeal in part the granting act approved .July 2, 1864. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rem·esentatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That in consequence of the failure of the Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company to construct its road from Wallula Junction to Portland, in the State 
of Oregon, a distance of two hundred and fourteen miles, over which line the said 
company have running connections with the Oregon Railway and Navigation Com-
pany, and have abandoned. the building of their own road between said points, the 
United States resumes the title to the lands granted to said company coterminous 
with said unfinished part of said road; and so much of the act making the grant of 
lands to said Northern Pacific Railroad Company as applies between Wallula and 
Portland is hereby repealed, and the said land is resumed as a part of the public do-
main. 
c 
H. Rep. 1226-3 
